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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Governments around the world take part in fierce international competition for foreign direct 
investment (FDI), not least by offering subsidies to multinational companies. Developing and 
newly industrializing countries are strongly advised, even by former critics of multinational 
companies such as the United Nations, to draw on FDI in order to supplement domestic 
savings and induce catching-up processes. This reflects the widely held belief, particularly 
among policymakers, that FDI has positive effects on economic growth that are supposed to 
result at least partly from technological spillovers. According to UN (2002: 5), the 
Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 has shown 
that “foreign direct investment contributes toward financing sustained economic growth over 
the long term. It is especially important for its potential to transfer knowledge and technology, 
create jobs, boost overall productivity, enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, and 
ultimately eradicate poverty through economic growth and development." 
The underlying argument is that FDI inflows amount to more than just capital imports. FDI is 
often thought of as "a composite bundle of capital stocks, know-how, and technology, and 
hence its impact on growth is expected to be manifold" (De Mello 1997: 1). JBIC Institute 
(2002: 1) posits that FDI is the dominant channel of international transfers of technology: 
"Multinational enterprises … are powerful and effective vehicles for disseminating 
technology from developed to developing countries and are often the only source of new and 
innovative technologies, which are usually not available in the arm’s-length market."1 
Yet, it is surprisingly hard to come by conclusive evidence supporting this predominant view. 
Previous empirical studies have resulted in highly ambiguous findings on the growth impact 
of FDI. A short review of the relevant literature reveals that the unique advantages of FDI 
over domestic investment as well as other forms of capital imports may be compromised in 
various ways (Section II). Several studies point to the relevance of supportive host-country 
conditions, which are often lacking in developing countries. However, the growth impact of 
FDI may also depend on investors' motivations and the type of FDI. The heterogeneity of FDI 
is largely ignored in the literature. 
                                                 
1   Likewise, Borensztein et al. (1998) and UNCTAD (1999: 207) consider FDI to be a major channel 
for developing countries to access advanced technologies. 3 
It is in two ways that we attempt to overcome this limitation (Section III). First, we consider 
various dimensions of FDI such as FDI-related R&D activities, technology imports, export 
operations and intra-firm trade - in addition to the conventionally used FDI stocks and flows. 
Second, we use disaggregated FDI data for specific industries, in contrast to the aggregate 
stock or flow data typically used in previous studies. We draw on the detailed online data base 
provided for US FDI by the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). 
We perform convergence regressions estimating the cross-country contribution of different 
dimensions of US FDI in different industries to convergence and growth. The form of these 
estimates is derived from a model of endogenous technological change similar to the one used 
by Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) to explain the impact of financial development 
on convergence (Section IV). The convergence regressions estimate the rate of growth in per-
capita income of host countries relative to the per-capita income of the United States (the 
dependent variable)2 in terms of US FDI, human development, financial development, and 
trade (the independent variables)3. The distinctive feature of convergence regressions is that 
the independent variables are also interacted with relative per-capita income, to obtain a 
measure of their impact on convergence. Thus for each of the independent variables we obtain 
two coefficients estimating their impact on growth as a function of relative per-capita income. 
We apply a panel approach, instrumenting for explanatory variables and correcting for 
correlated errors by clustering by countries. We also use a robust estimate to control for 
heteroskedasticity. 
We find that FDI dimensions for which the results are significant have a positive effect on the 
growth of relative income of fairly advanced host countries, therefore contributing to their 
convergence to US income levels (Section V). Yet the effect on relative growth diminishes 
for lower incomes and the convergence effect ceases for countries with relatively low per-
capita incomes. FDI contributes to convergence only for countries classified by the World 
Bank as high-income countries, and could contribute negatively for middle and low-income 
countries. This finding has important policy implications, as we conclude in Section VI. 
 
                                                 
2 That is, the rate of growth of y/yUS. 
3 Measured by life expectancy, private credit and imports plus exports (as proportions of GDP). 4 
II.  WHERE DO WE STAND? 
Based on a review of the literature, the OECD (2002: 13) concludes that FDI contributes to 
both factor productivity and income growth in host countries. Some recent studies do support 
such an optimistic assessment. Using FDI stock and flow data and applying OLS estimates, 
Ram and Zhang (2002) find the nexus between FDI and the host countries’ economic growth 
to be generally positive for the 1990s. Blonigen and Wang (2004) present Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimates of the determinants of per-capita growth across 
countries, including decade-averages of FDI inflows, for the 1970s and 1980s. Their estimates 
based on the full sample comprising both developing and developed host countries do not 
reveal a significant effect of FDI on growth. However, when including the interaction of 
explanatory variables with a dummy variable indicating developing host countries, the growth 
impact of FDI turns positive for almost all developing countries, except for some countries 
with particularly low levels of education. 
Yet it remains debatable if, and under which conditions, FDI leads to convergence. Several 
studies suggest that the growth impact of FDI depends on whether or not certain pre-
conditions are met in host countries. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) stress that openness to 
trade is essential for reaping positive growth effects of FDI. According to De Mello (1997), 
the larger the technological gap between the host and the home country of FDI, the smaller 
the impact FDI will have in the former. Alfaro et al. (2001) conclude that, below a threshold 
level of financial market development in the host country, FDI will not exert beneficial effects 
on growth. Borensztein et al. (1998) show that FDI raises growth only in countries with a 
sufficiently qualified labor force.4 In one way or another, these studies echo an earlier finding 
of Blomström et al. (1994), namely that developing countries must have reached a minimum 
level of economic development before they can capture the growth-enhancing effects of FDI. 
Furthermore, most of the earlier studies have some limitations in common, which may have as 
a consequence that the growth effects of FDI are overstated. First of all, the endogeneity of 
the FDI variable is often ignored. According to Carcovic and Levine (2002), the exogenous 
component of FDI flows does not exert a significant independent influence on per-capita 
                                                 
4  While Ram and Zhang (2002) do not find any evidence supporting the complementarity between 
FDI and the host country’s level of education for the 1990s, Blonigen and Wang (2004) report a 
similar pattern as in Borensztein et al. (1998), even though the turning point is shown to be at a 
lower level of education. 5 
income growth even if non-linearities caused by host-country characteristics are taken into 
account.5  
Second, most studies consider only FDI flows, even though Blonigen and Wang (2004) point 
out that theory would suggest that FDI stocks are the appropriate measure to be used in 
growth regressions. It is, thus, interesting to note that Caves (1996: 237) reckons that “the 
relationship between a LDC’s stock of foreign investment and its subsequent growth is a 
matter on which we totally lack trustworthy conclusions.” Dutt (1997), who uses stock data, 
even finds a significantly negative growth impact of FDI. 
Third, FDI dimensions other than stocks and flows are hardly considered in the literature on 
the FDI-growth nexus, even though they can reasonably be expected to play a role: 
•  The reasoning of Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) implies that world-market oriented 
FDI is superior to purely local-market oriented FDI because the former is more in line 
with comparative cost advantages of host countries.6 This suggests to consider FDI-
related exports as an important dimension of FDI, as we do in the subsequent analysis. 
•  UNCTAD (1998: 111-116) argues that multinational companies are increasingly 
pursuing complex integration strategies. Hence, the convergence effects of FDI may 
depend on the extent to which developing host countries are part of the sourcing and 
marketing networks of multinational companies. This can be checked by looking at 
another FDI dimension, namely the degree of vertical integration of foreign affiliates 
(proxied by imports from, and exports to the parent company). 
•  It is widely agreed in the literature that technology transfers and economic spillovers 
are crucially important for FDI to promote growth (OECD 2002: 95). Spillovers are 
notoriously difficult to measure.7 Their significance is likely to depend on (i) the 
                                                 
5  Blonigen and Wang (2004) argue, however, that this result is due to “inappropriate pooling of 
wealthy and poor countries.” 
6   Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) argue that so-called efficiency-seeking FDI is more likely to bring 
in technology and know-how that is compatible to the host country’ level of development, and to 
enable local suppliers and competitors to benefit from spillovers through adaptation and imitation. 
Moreover, this type of FDI is supposed to generate growth-enhancing export earnings. 
7  For a detailed review, see Blomström et al. (2000). Görg and Greenaway (2002) point out that 
studies reporting positive spillovers may provide a biased picture when cross-sectional data are 
used. This is because higher productivity in a particular sector may not only be the result of more 
FDI, but also be the reason for more FDI to flow into this sector. 6 
supply of superior technology and know-how by multinational companies, and (ii) the 
capacity of host countries to absorb superior technology and know-how. Hence, FDI 
may induce divergence, rather than convergence, not only because host countries lack 
absorptive capacity (Görg and Greenaway 2002; Xu 2000), but also because 
multinational companies supply less technology to developing countries. The latter 
proposition can be checked by considering FDI dimensions such as R&D activities of 
foreign affiliates and technology transfers by parent companies. 
Fourth, the literature largely ignores another aspect of the heterogeneity of FDI by using 
aggregate stock or flow data. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) argue that the motivations 
underlying FDI differ across sectors and manufacturing industries. It cannot be ruled out that 
this translates into varying growth effects of FDI in particular industries. For example, the 
growth effects tend to be compromised if FDI crowds out local investment. Fears of 
crowding-out, which were widespread in developing countries in the past, may have receded 
since several cross-country studies have found no evidence to this effect (Lipsey 2000). 
However, Agosin and Mayer (2000) show that crowding-out has been the norm in Latin 
America. Crowding-out may also depend on the sectoral structure of FDI. FDI in the services 
sector, often related to privatization programs, is an obvious case in point, but local 
investment may also be replaced in manufacturing industries in which local producers lack 
competitiveness.8 At the same time, FDI-related spillovers tend to be industry-specific 
(Kokko 2002). For instance, resource seeking FDI in the primary sector often takes place in 
economic enclaves with weak linkages to the local economy. 
All this suggests that favorable growth effects of FDI cannot be taken for granted. Poor 
countries may find themselves in a trap which is difficult to escape: FDI-related technology 
transfers and spillovers to the local economy would be required most urgently in poor 
countries to narrow particularly wide productivity gaps. However, the supply of superior 
technology by multinational companies to poor countries could be constrained by the type of 
FDI these host countries tend to attract. Furthermore, local firms may be too far behind in 
terms of technological and managerial development to benefit from imitating technologies 
applied by foreign investors and to become involved in corporate networks. 
 
                                                 
8   This is not to ignore that “crowding out of domestic investment through FDI may not necessarily 
be a problem” (OECD 2002: 26), if the released domestic resources are used for more productive 
purposes. 7 
III. US FDI IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: STYLIZED FACTS 
It is in two respects that detailed FDI data are required for a large number of host countries to 
pursue a cross-country analysis that accounts for the heterogeneity of FDI. First, in addition to 
conventionally used FDI dimensions such as FDI stocks and flows, other dimensions that may 
be relevant for the economic growth effects of FDI have to be covered. These include: R&D 
activities of foreign affiliates, technology transfers from parent companies to affiliates, the 
export orientation of affiliates, and the integration of affiliates into parent companies’ 
sourcing and marketing networks. Second, sectorally disaggregated data are needed to assess 
the relevance of industry characteristics in shaping the growth impact of FDI. To the best of 
our knowledge, there is only one data source that meets both requirements: the online data 
base provided by the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), for 
US FDI abroad as well as the activities (so-called operational data) of majority owned non-
bank affiliates of US parent companies. 
Comparable data are not available for other home countries. Hence, the subsequent analysis is 
restricted to the economic growth effects of US FDI . While it cannot be ruled out that the 
growth impact of FDI from other home countries differs from that of US FDI,9 it should be 
noted that the United States represents by far the most important home country of FDI; in 
2003 the United States accounted for slightly more than a quarter of worldwide outward FDI 
stocks (UNCTAD 2004: Annex table B.4).10 
We apply BEA data on the following FDI dimensions for the period 1980-2000: 
•  US direct investment position abroad on a historical cost basis, 
•  US direct investment abroad, capital outflows, 
•  US direct investment abroad, income, 
•  Royalties and license fees, US parents’ receipts, 
•  Research and development performed by affiliates, 
•  US exports of goods shipped to affiliates by US parents, 
                                                 
9  This may be because the structure of outward FDI stocks differs between major home countries. 
For instance, more than 90 percent of Germany’s FDI stocks are located in major industrialized 
countries, compared to less than 70 percent of US FDI stocks; the manufacturing sector accounts 
for less than 20 percent of Germany’s FDI stocks, but for almost one third of UK FDI stocks 
(OECD 2004). 
10   The United Kingdom ranked second with a share of less than 14 percent. 8 
•  US imports of goods shipped by affiliates to US parents, 
•  Employment of affiliates, 
•  Employee compensation of affiliates, 
•  Gross product of affiliates, 
•  Sales by affiliates to foreign countries other than the host country, 
•  Sales by affiliates to the United States, 
•  Total sales by affiliates. 
 
Information on some of these FDI dimensions is also used to compare different sectors and 
industries according to factor intensities and other characteristics such as export orientation 
and the degree of vertical integration. We draw on industry-specific BEA data for 
petroleum,11 manufacturing, wholesale trade, finance (except depository institutions)12, 
services,13 and other industries.14 The manufacturing sector is broken down further into food 
and kindred products, chemicals and allied products, primary and fabricated metals, industrial 
machinery and equipment, electronic and other electric equipment, transportation equipment, 
and other manufacturing. 
A comparison of different FDI dimensions and major characteristics of FDI in specific 
industries provides tentative insights as to why positive growth and convergence effects of 
FDI cannot be taken for granted. A simple inspection of the data indicates that for developing 
countries, and especially the poorest among them, it may be more difficult to derive economic 
benefits from FDI than to attract FDI. All developing countries15 hosted 30 percent of total 
US FDI stocks in 2000. Taking this share as a yardstick, Figure 1 portrays the relative 
importance of other FDI dimensions in developing countries. In other words, bars exceeding a 
                                                 
11 Petroleum, which comprises oil and gas extraction as well as petroleum and coal products, is used 
as a proxy for the primary sector that receives resource seeking FDI. The primary sector as a whole 
cannot be singled out from BEA data as agriculture and mining were included in “other industries” 
in the period of observation. 
12 Real estate and holding companies are subsumed under “finance” in the BEA source. 
13 “Services” according to BEA statistics comprise, inter alia, business services, hotels, health 
services, motion pictures, as well as engineering, architectural and surveying services. 
14 Some services items such as transportation and communication are included in “other industries.” 
15 All hosts of US FDI except Canada, European countries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan are 
regarded as developing countries in the following. 9 
ratio of one (the horizontal line in Figure 1) indicate that the share of developing countries 
with regard to this particular FDI dimension is higher than their share in US FDI stocks. For 
example, this is the case for employment of US affiliates as FDI in developing countries tends 
to be more labor intensive than FDI in developed countries. 
 
- Figure 1 somewhere here - 
More surprisingly perhaps, the export share of US affiliates in developing countries slightly 
exceeds the share of developing countries in US FDI stocks, and intra-firm trade of affiliates 
in developing countries with US parent companies is by far more important than FDI stocks 
would suggest.16 However, the strong vertical integration is exclusively due to US affiliates 
in Mexico. If Mexico is excluded from the group of developing host countries, the ratio of 
1.28 reported in Figure 1 drops to 0.75. This means that intra-firm trade with US parents is 
less advanced than FDI stocks would suggest for affiliates in developing countries other than 
Mexico. This is especially so for particularly poor developing host countries. The sum of 
affiliate exports to, and affiliate imports from US parent companies amounted to less than 4 
percent of total sales by US affiliates operating in African countries, compared to more than 
11 percent of total sales by US affiliates operating in developed countries (data for 2000 from 
BEA). At the same time, 82 percent of total sales by US affiliates in the manufacturing sector 
of African host countries were destined to local markets, while the corresponding share was 
59 percent in developed host countries. 
FDI-induced convergence of poor developing countries also appears to have been hindered by 
relatively weak R&D activities of US affiliates in these host countries. Even though Africa's 
share in total US FDI stocks just slightly exceeded one percent in 2000, its share in R&D 
expenditures of all US affiliates was still much lower (0.14 percent). It is also for all 
developing countries that the share in FDI-related R&D activities falls considerably short of 
the share in FDI stocks (Figure 1).17 The concentration of R&D activities in developed host 
countries is not unexpected, considering relative factor endowments in developed and 
                                                 
16 The latter observation may indicate that vertical FDI, which aims at making use of international 
cost differentials, figures more prominently in developing countries than in developed countries, 
where horizontal FDI dominates because of factor endowments that are similar to those in the 
United States. For the motivations underlying vertical and horizontal FDI, see, e.g., Carr et al. 
(2001). 
17 In this regard, excluding Mexico does not change the picture. 10 
developing countries. However, developing countries also received considerably less 
technology transfers, measured by royalties and license fees paid by US affiliates to their 
parent companies, than the share of developing countries in US FDI stocks would have 
suggested.18 Hence, the limited supply of advanced technologies by US direct investors to 
developing host countries may have constrained the potential of growth-enhancing spillovers 
to the local economy. 
The sectoral structure of US FDI in developed and developing host countries offers further 
insights to this effect. Resource seeking FDI in the primary sector plays a marginal role in 
developed countries, but figures prominently in poor developing countries. US FDI in the 
petroleum industry, which we consider a proxy of this type of FDI, accounted for more than 
60 percent of total US FDI stocks in Africa in 2000 (compared to 7 percent in developed 
countries). FDI in the petroleum industry is exceptional in various respects: It is extremely 
capital intensive, technology transfers and R&D activities by US affiliates are negligible, and 
the degree of vertical integration is very low (Table 1). In addition, resource seeking FDI in 
this industry is often in economic enclaves with few linkages to the local product and labor 
markets. Rather than enhancing economic development of poor host countries, it tends to 
induce rent-seeking and might cause "Dutch disease" effects. According to Nunnenkamp and 
Spatz (2004), resource seeking FDI in the petroleum industry may even be detrimental to 
growth, especially in developing countries with weak institutions. 
- Table 1 somewhere here - 
The structure of FDI in the manufacturing sector, too, differs significantly between developed 
and developing host countries. The share of developing countries in industry-specific FDI 
stocks held by the United States in all host countries ranges from 19 percent in chemicals and 
metals to 50 percent in electronic equipment (Figure 2). At the same time, manufacturing 
industries differ significantly with regard to factor intensities, technology transfers, export 
orientation and vertical integration (Table 1). For example, US FDI in the labor intensive 
electronic equipment industry of developing countries is in accordance with factor 
endowments typically prevailing in these host countries. Positive growth effects may have 
been supported by the strong export orientation and the high degree of vertical integration in 
this industry. On the other hand, technology transfers to affiliates operating in the electronic 
equipment industry are clearly below the manufacturing average. By contrast, machinery 
                                                 
18 The ratio of 0.7 shown in Figure 1 declines further to 0.64 if Mexico is excluded. 11 
stands out in terms of high technology transfers, and transport equipment in terms of high 
R&D activities undertaken by US affiliates. Mainly developed host countries of US FDI may 
have benefited from the application of recent technologies in these industries, considering that 
about three quarters of US FDI stocks were located in developed countries. This applies even 
more so to the chemical industry, which ranks second (behind machinery) when local R&D 
and technology transfers are taken together. 
- Figure 2 somewhere here - 
Likewise, mainly developed countries appear to have benefited from high technology 
transfers in services industries (as defined by BEA). As shown in Figure 2, the share of 
developing countries in industry-specific FDI stocks was particularly low (16.5 percent) in 
"services." Considering the group of five industries in which technology transfers exceeded 
the average of 4.57 percent of US affiliates' value added (food, chemicals, machinery, 
wholesale trade, and services), 78 percent of US FDI stocks were located in developed host 
countries. By contrast, the share of developing countries in US FDI stocks was relatively high 
(34 percent) for the group of seven industries in which technology transfers remained below 
the average. This pattern underscores our proposition that FDI may lead to divergence, rather 
than convergence. 
IV. MODEL AND ESTIMATION APPROACH 
While most current theories of cross-country differences in per-capita income imply that all 
countries share the same long-run growth rate (of TFP or per-capita GDP), a recent strand of 
literature in endogenous technological change has expanded the scope of both theoretical and 
empirical studies to include the possibility of long-term differences in growth rates. The 
historical record shows that growth rates indeed differ substantially across countries over long 
periods of time. For example, Pritchett (1997) estimates that the proportional gap in per-capita 
GDP between the richest and poorest countries grew more than five-fold from 1870 to 1990. 
According to Maddison (2001), the proportional gap between the richest group of countries 
and the poorest grew from 3 in 1820 to 19 in 1998.  
The divergence between rich and poor countries continued through the end of the twentieth 
century. Although studies such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) and Evans (1996) show that a substantial group of rich and middle-income countries 
have been converging to parallel growth paths over the past 50 years or so, the gap between 
these countries as a whole and the poorest countries as a whole has continued to widen. For 
example, the proportional gap in per-capita GDP between Mayer-Foulkes' (2002) richest and 12 
poorest convergence groups grew by a factor of 2.6 between 1960 and 1995, the period 
usually studied in cross-country regressions, and the proportional gap between Maddison's 
richest and poorest groups grew by a factor of 1.75 between 1950 and 1998.  
In the last decade the empirical growth literature has arrived at the consensus that 
technological differences are a central factor underlying divergence. Easterly and Levine 
(2001) estimate that about 60 percent of the cross-country variation in growth rates of per-
capita GDP is attributable to differences in productivity growth, while Klenow and 
Rodríguez-Clare (1997) estimate that in their sample about 90 percent of the variation is 
attributable to differences in productivity growth. Thus divergence reflects long-lasting cross-
country differences in rates of technological progress.  
Of course, the level of productivity can be affected by many factors. For example, 
geographical and institutional factors may diminish the efficiency of resource allocation. 
Also, economy-wide market failures slow down the accumulation of human capital. However, 
given that these factors are relatively constant, they must work through their effect on 
technological change to make differences in the growth rate of productivity persist for long. 
In two recent papers, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005) develop theoretical models of endogenous technological change extending the 
theory of endogenous technological change so that it can account for underdevelopment. In 
these models technological leaders and some groups of following countries grow at the 
growth rate of the technological leading edge, while other followers further behind may grow 
at a lower rate. Essentially, what defines underdevelopment are economic phenomena that 
impede technological change, for example threshold requirements in human capital 
accumulation to attain R&D rather than being restricted to technological implementation, and 
institutional development necessary for credit markets to fuel desired levels of technological 
change. When these failures are not too strong, countries will lag in levels but not in growth, 
while for stronger failures countries will also attain lower growth rates.  
Both papers introduce models for closed economies in which growth occurs through 
technological transfers (exchange of ideas) whose rate is governed by local characteristics of 
the economy. These local characteristics determine the rate of absorption of innovations 
occurring worldwide or, for simplicity, in leading economies. A convergence effect exists 
because the farther behind an economy lags, the more technologies can be tapped from world 
knowledge. However, divergence is possible because local conditions may make the rate of 
absorption too low. Thus, the extent to which follower economies will convergence in growth 13 
rates or levels to the leading economies is endogenously determined. Essentially, both papers 
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where  t t t A A a / =  represents the technological level At of a small country with respect to the 
technological leading edge  t A , µ represents the probability of innovation in each intermediate 
sector, itself a function of variables Xt (such as financial development or a threshold effect for 
the possibility of R&D) which might in turn depend on at. Finally, gt represents the growth 
rate of the technological frontier.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is widely believed that FDI works like credit. If this is 
true, the above model can be considered an adequate point of departure for the econometric 
estimates. We assume in the following that there is a set of variables Xt influencing the 
probability of innovation and, therefore, determining the magnitude (and sign) of 
convergence. These variables include FDI and variables that are essential to control for if the 
impact of FDI is to be ascertained, namely credit, trade, and human and physical capital.  
We follow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), who evaluate the effects of financial 
development on convergence, and use worker productivity as a proxy for technological levels, 
because these cannot be measured directly.20 Hence, the relative technological level at is 
represented by relative per-capita income to the United States, which proxies for the 
technological leading edge. The estimate has the form of a standard growth regression in the 
relative income variable, except for the inclusion of an interaction term between credit – the 
variable influencing convergence – and the initial relative income term.21 Here we perform a 
similar estimate, except that we expand the variables influencing convergence to include 
credit, US FDI, openness to trade, capital and human capital. Also, we consider a panel rather 
than just a cross-section, and instrument all stock variables. 
                                                 
19 Countries are regarded as small if they have an insignificant effect on the rate of growth of the 
leading technological edge. 
20 The estimates of technological levels depend on assumptions on the production function and on 
measurements of human and physical capital which are not very precise and are in any case 
somewhat scarce for low income countries. 
21 It is shown under some assumptions that this regression model can be derived from a loglinear 
approximation to (1). 14 
Let i index countries and t time, and let Xi,t stand for the variables influencing convergence, 
yi,t represents the log of per-capita income of country i. Define the relative per-capita income 
to the United States, a deflated variable that proxies for at, by: 
t US t i t i y y y , , , ˆ − = .           ( 2 )  
We estimate the following equation, which we call a convergence regression: 
t i t t i t i t i y t i t i y t i y y y , , , , , , 0 5 , ˆ ˆ ˆ η ε β β + + + + + + = ∆ + Z β X β X β Z X X .    (3) 
Here ∆ is the forward difference operator, so that the dependent variable is the growth rate of 
relative per-capita income. Xi,t are variables influencing convergence, stated in a bounded 
form consistent with a steady state analysis. In our case, these variables characterizing the 
economy are the ratios of private credit, US FDI, imports plus exports, and physical capital to 
GDP, and the absolute variable, log life expectancy. Averages of Xi,t and  t i y , ˆ  over the five-
year period t to t + 5 are used because the convergence effect that is modeled occurs 
continuously over this period. Finally, Zi,t are other variables and their coefficients. In 
particular, we use for Zi,t the changes in the ratios of physical and human capital to GDP, thus 
controlling for the effects of physical and human capital accumulation on growth. Also, we 
include a fixed time effect εt  in some of the regressions. All of the variables in the regression 
are stationary variables.  
Thus, our estimates control for the most important variables that could have an impact on 
economic growth, and also for the most important variables which could be related to FDI, 
namely physical and human capital accumulation, institutional arrangements affecting the 
economy, represented by the amount of private credit as a ratio to GDP, and openness to 
trade. 
Physical and human capital accumulation are considered in two ways. First, as stocks which 
may themselves determine growth and convergence rates. In the case of physical capital, we 
use the ratio to GDP, which is a stationary variable and less subject to endogenous variation 
(Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997). Second, we control for changes in this physical capital 
ratio and for changes in life expectancy within each period (our flow variables), that is, for 
changes in inputs which may give rise to growth independently of any FDI effects. 
As shown in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), the rate of convergence estimated 
for each country is  t i y y , X βX + β . Convergence occurs if this is negative. If a variable in Xi,t 15 
promotes convergence it will have a negative coefficient in βiXy. Also, relative income levels 
depend positively on the non-interacted coefficient βiX. As reported in detail below, we find 
that US FDI consistently obtains positive signs for both coefficients. The positive sign for the 
non-interacted coefficient βiX (the intercept) means that US FDI contributes positively to the 
growth of per-capita income relative to the United States for countries with an income at the 
US level. A positive sign for the interacted coefficient βiXy (the slope) means that this effect 
diminishes for lower incomes. An estimate is made of the relative income level at which the 
effect becomes zero. This usually occurs at higher income levels as defined in the World 
Bank classification. 
The sample is defined by those countries for which the private credit variable, per-capita 
income, and life expectancy are available, over the quinquenia 1980-1985 to 1995-2000, 
amounting to 313 observations.22 For part of this sample, trade and physical capital variables 
are unavailable. So as not to reduce the sample, we made the observation for these variables 
zero and included a dummy for “Not available (NA)”.  
In convergence regression (3), the error term may be correlated with the variables  t i, X  
influencing convergence (due to endogeneity), and with the mean relative income level  t i y , ˆ  
occurring through the period t to t + 5. In addition, the errors may be correlated across time 
periods for each country. This second problem is corrected using clustering and a robust 
estimate of the errors. To correct for the first problem, all of the variables  t i, X  and their 
interactions with  t i y , ˆ  are instrumented using instruments for  t i, X  and their interactions with 
yi,t. Table 2 lists the set of instruments we use. 




Private credit  Legal origin dummies 
US FDI  Log distance to US, log area, tropical, latitude, landlocked 
Openness to trade  Exports and imports in 1958 
Life expectancy  Life expectancy in 1962. 
 
Legal origin dummies for English, French, German and Scandinavian legal systems are 
exogenous variables mostly determined long before our estimation period 1980-2000. These 
                                                 
22 Including life expectancy only eliminates four observations. 16 
variables are intimately associated with the property rights regime that makes private credit 
possible and instrument for the institutional structure of the countries. They are used by 
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and later Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) to 
study the impact of financial development on economic growth. The four dummies were 
supplemented by a “Legal origin not available” dummy so as not to reduce the sample.  
In the case of US FDI, the distance to United States is a natural instrument. The remaining 
variables log area, tropical, latitude, and landlocked may also have a bearing on the incentives 
for FDI, and are found to be statistically relevant. Moreover, since instruments are in fact used 
jointly, the presence of these geographical instruments strengthens the instrument set as a 
whole. The instruments are fairly effective, as can be seen from the OLS regressions for US 
FDI stocks (historical cost basis) and R&D expenditures of US affiliates, taken over the 
regression sample (Table 3). For openness to trade and life expectancy, we simply use the 
corresponding variables for 1958 and 1962, respectively. 17 
 









-0.046 -0.019  Log Distance 
to US  [1.73] [2.01]* 
-0.044 -0.017  Log Area 
[3.53]** [5.14]** 
-0.002 0  Latitude 
[1.78] [0.87] 
0.298 -0.028  Landlocked 
[4.29]** [1.35] 
0.19 0.001  Tropical 
[3.22]** [0.11] 
1.347 0.362  Constant 
[5.16]** [4.27]** 
Observations 317 129 
R-squared 0.17  0.24 
aRobust t statistics in square brackets; 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant 
at 1 percent 
 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We use convergence regression (3) to estimate the effect of US FDI on the growth of income 
relative to the United States, according to the relative income of each country. Estimates are 
run for each of the 13 FDI dimensions listed in Section III. At the same time, we make use of 
the industrial classification of the BEA data. In addition to applying aggregate FDI data for all 
industries and total manufacturing, we run the estimates on the basis of industry-specific data 
for 12 industries (petroleum, wholesale trade, finance, services, other industries, food and 
kindred products, chemicals and allied products, primary and fabricated metals, industrial 
machinery and equipment, electronic and other electric equipment, transportation equipment, 
and other manufacturing).23 In principle, this results in 13*14 regressions. In all, there were 
54 regressions for which there were more than 50 US FDI data points (in the 1980-1995 
sample, which has 313 observations). 
                                                 
23 See Section III for detailed description. 18 
Another limiting factor in running the regressions was the availability of data for physical 
capital, which ends in 1992. Extrapolation was used to generate the 1990-1995 average of the 
level and the rate of change of capital. However, it was impossible to include capital in the 
1995-2000 period. 
Physical capital change is clearly endogenous with economic growth errors, but this variable 
need not necessarily be instrumented since we are not interested in an estimate of its 
coefficient. Moreover, we do not have any specific instruments for it. Nevertheless, since our 
set of instruments is relatively large, it is possible to run the estimates instrumenting for all of 
the variables. Note also that the inclusion of time dummies, a somewhat non-economic 
variable, could reduce the significance of the results. Finally, excluding the physical capital 
variable allows considering a larger sample. According to these considerations, the 
regressions were run in five different ways (Table 4). 
 
    Table 4 – Description of Estimates 
Estimate Sample  Instrumented  variables 
1 1980-1995  All stock variables and also 
physical and human capital change 
2  1980-1995  All stock variables  
3 1980-1995  All stock variables; no time 
dummies used 
4 1980-2000  All stock variables; NA dummy for 
capital included 
5  1980-2000  All stock variables; all physical 
capital variables excluded 
 
 
Overall, the findings are similar across regression sets. Table 5 presents a comparison of 
estimates 1 to 5 when applied to US FDI stocks on historical cost basis, for both the 19 
instrumented and non-instrumented versions.24 Most of the results achieved for controlling 
variables are plausible. Initial relative income is always significantly negative with little 
variation in coefficient values. Likewise, life expectancy, which proxies for human capital, 
obtains fairly robust results. Both, the level of life expectancy and its interaction with initial 
relative income are significantly positive. Physical capital, trade and private credit lose 
significance after instrumentation. By contrast, the instrumentation increases the coefficient 
obtained for US FDI, as is to be expected for a variable that is positively correlated with 
shocks to economic growth. The coefficients of US FDI and its interaction with initial relative 
income are hardly affected when varying the sample and instrumentation according to 
estimates 1 to 5. Both coefficients turn out to be significantly positive. The positive sign of 
the interaction term means that US FDI leads to divergence rather than convergence for host 
countries below a certain threshold of relative income (see below for details).  
- Table 5 somewhere here - 
The finding that the non-interacted as well as the interacted coefficients of FDI are positive 
also applies to other FDI dimensions and particular industries. This can be seen in Figure 3 
which portrays the histograms of all these coefficients as well as the corresponding t-statistics. 
Almost all non-interacted coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; the same is true 
for roughly half of the interacted coefficients. The results achieved from a regression across 
the total set of FDI coefficients underscore that the choice between estimates 1 to 5 has little 
effect. The underlying regression equation is as follows: 
 






ij i i E I c
  Estimate   Aspects   Economic   Industries
η β α  
 
This regression reveals the effect on US FDI coefficients of belonging to a specific industry 
or FDI dimension. Iij is 1 if coefficient i belongs to industry j and zero otherwise, and 
similarly in the case of Eij for FDI dimensions. Fixed effects ηij for each estimate j = 1 to 5 are 
also included.  
- Figure 3 somewhere here - 
                                                 
24 The complete regression results for other FDI dimensions and particular industries are not reported 
here, but are available from the authors upon request. 20 
The regression effects show that the three estimates for the 1980-1995 sample are essentially 
the same (Table 6, lower panel). The results obtained for the 1980-2000 sample including 
physical capital give slightly higher non-interacted coefficients which are slightly less 
significant. By contrast, the exclusion of the physical capital variable has the effect that all 
coefficients are higher and more significant. 
- Table 6 somewhere here - 
The findings reported so far strongly suggest that US FDI, in general, contributes to 
convergence only in host countries that have achieved a relatively high per-capita income 
already. Yet, the estimates run for different dimensions of FDI and for FDI in particular 
industries support the proposition that FDI is a heterogeneous phenomenon. In Table 7, we 
consider various FDI dimensions, in addition to the conventionally used FDI stocks and 
flows, and report the coefficients of the non-interacted and interacted FDI terms for US FDI 
in all industries and total manufacturing: 
•  Using aggregated data for all industries, it turns out that both coefficients of US FDI 
outflows are considerably higher than those of US FDI stocks on historical cost basis. 
This is consistent with previous studies which typically show weaker growth effects 
when relying on stock data.25 
•  Compared to FDI stocks, almost all other FDI dimensions obtain a higher coefficient 
of the non-interacted FDI term. In particular when using aggregated data for all 
industries, as most previous studies do, the effects of FDI appear to be understated by 
measuring FDI on the basis of stock data. This is probably because FDI stocks do not 
adequately reflect FDI-related activities of foreign affiliates. The strongest effects are 
shown if FDI is measured by R&D activities undertaken by US affiliates in host 
countries. 
•  The  interacted FDI terms remain insignificant for several FDI dimensions. For 
example, there is no evidence of divergence effects with regard to the employment of 
affiliates, their sales to the United States and shipments to parent companies. By 
contrast, the coefficient and significance of the interacted term is particularly high for 
R&D by affiliates. 
- Table 7 somewhere here - 
                                                 
25 See Section II as well as Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004). 21 
The second panel of Table 6 compares the coefficients of the non-interacted and interacted 
FDI terms between FDI dimensions by running the above regression across the total set of 
FDI coefficients. The results underscore that higher coefficient values, though often 
associated with lower significance, are achieved when considering FDI dimensions other than 
FDI stocks on historical cost basis. In most instances, both the non-interacted and the 
interacted terms turn out to be higher compared to the reference of FDI stocks. However, 
making full use of the coefficients achieved in industry-specific estimates results in two 
important deviations from the findings reported in Table 7 on the basis of aggregated FDI 
data for all industries. First, the effects of FDI outflows are no longer stronger than the effects 
of FDI stocks. Second, royalties and license fees, which proxy technology transfers from US 
parents to their foreign affiliates, still obtain a higher coefficient of the interaction term, but 
the non-interaction term turns insignificant when compared to that of FDI stocks.26 
The regressions in Table 6 can be used to estimate the impact of different FDI dimensions, as 
well as FDI in different industries, on economic growth and convergence in the host countries 
of US FDI. Figure 4 presents the calculations for selected FDI dimensions. It turns out that the 
threshold of relative per-capita income beyond which convergence occurs depends on which 
FDI-related activity is considered. Most notably, only high-income host countries (according 
to World Bank classification) are likely to benefit from technology transfers from US parent 
companies, proxied by royalties and license fees. This provides strong support to the 
reasoning in Sections II and IV that many developing countries lack absorptive capacity and 
are plagued by local conditions impeding technological spillovers. Even when considering 
employment or total sales of US affiliates, however, convergence effects appear to be 
restricted to fairly advanced host countries in the upper middle or higher income groups. 
- Figure 4 somewhere here - 
Turning to industry-specific estimates, it has to be recalled that the number of FDI-related 
observations is often below 50. Estimates are based on a larger number of observations for 
almost all particular industries (except industrial machinery and transportation equipment) 
only if FDI stocks on historical cost basis are used. Hence, we start with this FDI dimension 
to estimate the industry-specific coefficients of the non-interacted and interacted terms (Table 
8, first two columns). Both coefficients remain insignificant for three industries: In the case of 
“finance”, this may be due to the inclusion of FDI in real estate and holding companies (see 
                                                 
26 R&D performed by US affiliates is not listed in Table 6 as industry-specific data are largely lacking 
for this FDI dimension. 22 
Section III). Likewise, “other manufacturing” represents a fairly heterogeneous set of 
industries. More surprisingly perhaps, it is also for chemicals that both FDI coefficients are 
insignificant. A possible explanation is that US FDI in this industry is extremely concentrated 
in industrialized host countries (Figure 2 above). Note that the results based on FDI stocks are 
relatively weak for the metal industry, too, which represents another manufacturing industry 
with an extremely strong concentration of US FDI in industrialized countries. However, the 
estimates based on some other FDI dimensions (e.g., sales to foreign countries as well as 
royalties and license fees in Table 8) suggest another explanation, namely that stock data do 
not adequately reflect FDI-related activities, especially so in the chemical industry. 
- Table 8 somewhere here - 
In addition to the aforementioned industries, the interaction term remains insignificant for 
FDI stocks in industrial machinery and equipment. Divergence effects of FDI in this industry 
may have been contained by particularly high technology transfers to US affiliates and their 
particularly strong export orientation (Table 1 above). However, the number of FDI-related 
observations in machinery is too small to draw strong conclusions. Moreover, similar to 
chemicals, the results for machinery vary considerably across FDI dimensions: Considering 
royalties and license fees, instead of FDI stocks, both the non-interaction and the interaction 
terms turn out to be insignificant, whereas both terms are significantly positive when 
considering the sales of US affiliates to foreign countries other than the host country. 
Different industry characteristics notwithstanding, the results are fairly similar for FDI stocks 
in the remaining industries. Yet, it is also for these industries that relying exclusively on stock 
data may provide a misleading picture on the effects of FDI on growth and convergence. As 
before with regard to FDI dimensions, the first panel of Table 6 compares the coefficients of 
the non-interacted and interacted FDI terms between industries, based on the total set of FDI 
coefficients with all industries serving as the reference.27 There are three categories of 
industries: 
(i)  Relatively high coefficients for both the non-interaction and interactions terms are 
shown for petroleum, wholesale trade, services, and other industries. 
                                                 
27There are no entries for industrial machinery and transportation equipment as the regression 
underlying Table 6 is restricted to coefficients based on at least 50 observations. 23 
(ii)  Manufacturing as a whole as well as food, chemicals, and other manufacturing obtain 
a lower coefficient of the non-interaction term, while the interaction term reveals little 
difference compared to the reference of all industries. 
(iii)  Divergence effects appear most likely in the metal industry, in electronic and electric 
equipment, and in finance. It may be surprising that electronic and electric equipment 
belongs to the third category. US FDI in this relatively labor intensive industry tends 
to be in accordance with factor endowments prevailing in developing host countries. 
As noted in Section III, however, convergence induced by FDI in electronic and 
electric equipment may have been hindered by minor technology transfers in this 
industry. 
The estimated impact of US FDI on convergence, portrayed in Figure 5 for selected 
industries, underscores the differences across industries outlined above. For host countries 
close to US income levels, we observe relatively strong convergence effects if US FDI takes 
place in the services sector (wholesale trade and “services” as defined by BEA) and in the 
petroleum industry. By contrast, convergence effects are marginal at best, even in most 
advanced host countries, for FDI in some industries, including food, metals, and electronic 
and electric equipment. All industries have in common, however, that the threshold of relative 
per-capita income beyond which US FDI leads to convergence is fairly high, i.e., in the range 
of high-income countries as defined by the World Bank. 
- Figure 5 somewhere here - 
 
VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we perform convergence regressions that estimate the rate of growth in per-
capita income relative to the per-capita income of the United States (the dependent variable) 
in terms of US FDI, human development, financial development, and trade (the independent 
variables). The distinctive feature of convergence regressions is that the independent variables 
are also interacted with relative per-capita income, to obtain a measure of their impact on 
convergence. Thus for each of the independent variables we obtain two coefficients 
estimating their impact on growth as a function of relative per-capita income. We apply a 
panel approach, instrumenting for explanatory variables and correcting for correlated errors 
by clustering by countries. We also use a robust estimate to control for heteroskedasticity. 24 
At the same time, we account for the heterogeneity of FDI that is largely ignored in previous 
empirical studies on the growth impact of FDI. We consider various US FDI-related activities 
such as R&D undertaken by foreign affiliates, technology imports from parent companies, 
export operations of affiliates and intra-firm trade – in addition to the conventionally used 
FDI stocks and flows. Furthermore, we draw on industry-specific FDI data provided by the 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, rather than exclusively relying 
on highly aggregated data as typically done in previous studies. 
Our findings support the proposition that the widely used measure of FDI stocks does not 
adequately reflect FDI-related economic activities of foreign affiliates of US based 
multinational companies. Both the non-interacted and the interacted terms of FDI vary across 
FDI-related activities. FDI dimensions such as the employment of US affiliates and their total 
sales are more likely to contribute to convergence than the mere presence of US affiliates, as 
reflected in FDI stocks. By contrast, convergence effects are less likely to result from 
technology transfers by US parent companies, as indicated by technology transfer payments 
of US affiliates in the form of royalties and license fees. This supports the view that many 
developing countries lack absorptive capacity and are plagued by local conditions impeding 
technological spillovers. 
Differences in growth and convergence effects are less pronounced when comparing US FDI 
across industries than across economic dimensions of FDI. This may be due, at least partly, to 
data limitations. For various FDI dimensions, industry-specific estimates of convergence 
equations suffer from an insufficient number of observations. Based on FDI stocks (more 
observations are available for this inferior measure), we found similar results for industries 
revealing different characteristics in terms of factor intensities and export orientation. Yet, 
divergence effects appear to be more likely in some industries, including the electronic and 
electric equipment industry. Convergence effects in this relatively labor intensive industry, in 
which US FDI tends to be in accordance with factor endowments prevailing in developing 
countries, may have been hindered by weak technological spillovers. 
These differences across FDI dimensions and industries notwithstanding, the convergence 
regressions have one important thing in common. While economic activities related to US 
FDI have a positive effect on the growth of relative income in fairly advanced host countries, 
therefore contributing to their convergence to US income levels, this effect diminishes for 
lower-income host countries. In most host countries classified by the World Bank as low- or 
middle-income countries, US FDI tends to widen income differentials. 25 
Hence, our analysis puts into question the currently prevailing euphoria about FDI as a means 
to induce or strengthen economic catching-up processes of developing countries. Hopes raised 
by international organizations, notably the United Nations, that FDI could help eradicate 
poverty appear to be highly unreasonable. The central challenge facing policymakers in 
developing countries is not to attract FDI, but to improve the local conditions required to 
benefit from the widely perceived unique advantages of FDI. The absorptive capacity of host 
countries in making use of superior technologies applied by foreign direct investors appears to 
be crucially important in this regard. Local firms are often too far behind the technological 
frontier to grasp opportunities for technological and managerial imitation. 
This leads to the conclusion that policymakers in developing countries should focus their 
attention on local economic phenomena that impede technological progress. Human capital 
formation, institution building and local enterprise development may help raise the rate of 
absorption of technological and managerial innovations available worldwide. Unless the 
technological gap is narrowed in this way, it makes little sense to enter into the fierce 
international competition for FDI by offering fiscal incentives and outright subsidies, in order 
to attract FDI in technologically advanced operations. Developing countries should use scarce 
public resources more productively. 26 
Table 1 — Characteristics of Industries: Selected Indicators for All Host Countries of US 













All  industries  13.4  33.2  2.90 4.57 35.3 16.4 
Petroleum  1.8  49.9  0.13 0.02 22.5  4.3 
Total  manufacturing  15.9  31.5  5.19 4.85 44.5 25.5 
Food  16.5  26.2  1.36 5.37 26.1  5.1 
Chemicals  10.2  41.0  7.78 6.12 35.2 12.6 
Metals  17.3  33.5  1.59 1.99 33.5 11.4 
Machinery  15.7  36.2  3.12  11.33 60.7 28.9 
Electr.  equip.  31.7  19.0  5.68 3.68 57.2 41.1 
Transp.  equip.  15.4  37.5 10.78 0.20 52.4 46.9 
Other  man.  14.7  30.8  2.37 3.84 34.2 14.7 
Wholesale  trade  9.5  48.7  1.16 6.76 35.4 16.5 
Finance  10.0  60.4  0.25 3.50 33.9 0.02 
Services 18.5  37.2  1.95  10.97  18.3  2.0 
Other  industries  28.0 18.4 0.09  2.87 9.5 3.2 
aNumber of employees of US affiliates per million $ of value added. — bCompensation of employees ($ 
1000) per employee of US affiliates. — cR&D expenditures of US affiliates in percent of value added. — 
dRoyalties and license fees paid by US affiliates to their parent companies in percent of value added. — 
eTotal exports of US affiliates in percent of total sales. — fSum of exports of US affiliates to, and imports of 
US affiliates from their parent companies in percent of total sales of US affiliates. 
Quelle: BEA. 27 
Table 5 —  Comparison between Convergence Regressions for Per-capita Income Relative 
to US
a (Instrumented Variables
b, Clustered by Countries, Robust Estimates) 
  1  2  3  4  5  1(OLS) 2(OLS) 3(OLS) 4(OLS) 5(OLS) 
Initial relative   -0.31   -0.316   -0.336   -0.301   -0.293   -0.327   -0.328   -0.328   -0.34   -0.342  
   income y   (7.52)**   (7.46)**   (6.67)**   (6.15)**   (6.81)**   (17.62)**  (16.97)**  (16.97)**   (19.40)**   (19.61)** 
US FDI(stocks  0.022   0.023   0.022   0.02   0.02   0.015   0.014   0.014   0.014   0.013  
   at hist. cost)  (3.15)**  (3.11)**  (2.44)*  (2.34)*  (2.79)**  (3.49)**  (3.11)**  (3.11)**  (3.37)**  (2.84)** 
US FDI ×   0.02   0.021   0.021   0.018   0.02   0.008   0.007   0.007   0.007   0.008  
    Average y   (2.31)*   (2.41)*   (1.97)   (1.97)   (2.63)**   (2.95)**   (2.86)**   (2.86)**   (2.98)**   (3.00)**  
Life   0.207   0.21   0.233   0.208   0.19   0.228   0.224   0.224   0.223   0.223  
   expectancy  (6.53)**  (6.44)**  (6.15)**  (6.28)**  (6.14)**  (10.17)**  (9.14)**  (9.14)**  (10.02)**  (10.51)** 
Life expect ×   0.069   0.071   0.077   0.066   0.066   0.069   0.07   0.07   0.071   0.071  
      Average  y  (6.69)**  (6.66)**  (6.24)**  (5.59)**  (6.26)**  (13.16)** (12.89)** (12.89)** (14.62)** (15.02)** 
Private credit   -0.014   -0.013   -0.009   -0.013   -0.005   -0.018   -0.018   -0.018   -0.021   -0.012  
  (1.29)   (1.13)   (0.73)   (1.03)   (0.55)   (2.87)**   (2.90)**   (2.90)**   (3.69)**   (2.97)**  
Private credit   -0.025   -0.022   -0.005   -0.015   -0.034   -0.016   -0.017   -0.017   -0.018   -0.015  
   × Average y   (1.38)   (1.18)   (0.19)   (0.53)   (1.76)   (2.93)**   (3.02)**   (3.02)**   (3.65)**   (3.87)**  
Trade   0.01   0.009   0.008   0.01   0.008   0.012   0.011   0.011   0.013   0.013  
  (1.54)   (1.43)   (1.17)   (1.60)   (1.38)   (2.99)**   (2.88)**   (2.88)**   (3.30)**   (3.47)**  
Trade ×   0.002   0.001   -0.001   0.001   0.001   0.006   0.006   0.006   0.009   0.009  
   Average y   (0.27)   (0.20)   (0.19)   (0.21)   (0.17)   (2.53)*   (2.47)*   (2.47)*   (3.27)**   (3.71)**  
NA Trade   0.04   0.037   0.029   0.031   0.032   0.052   0.049   0.049   0.054   0.057  
  (1.51)   (1.40)   (1.05)   (1.22)   (1.36)   (2.94)**   (2.83)**   (2.83)**   (3.21)**   (3.75)**  
NA Trade ×   0.005   0.003   -0.01   -0.001   0.001   0.027   0.026   0.026   0.034   0.038  
   Average y   (0.19)   (0.11)   (0.34)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (2.47)*   (2.41)*   (2.41)*   (3.18)**   (3.85)**  
Capital   0.012   0.012   0.021   0.022     0.012   0.011   0.011   0.011    
  (1.01)   (0.95)   (0.88)   (1.36)     (2.35)*   (2.21)*   (2.21)*   (2.50)*    
Capital ×   -0.012   -0.016   -0.022   -0.008     0.006   0.005   0.005   0.008    
   Average y  (0.57)  (0.71)  (0.68)  (0.32)    (1.15) (1.05) (1.05) (2.00)*   
NA Capital   0   0.003   0.014   0.016     -0.001   0.001   0.001   0.002    
  (0.03)   (0.25)   (0.80)   (0.93)     (0.20)   (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.34)    
NA Capital ×   -0.002   -0.002   0.004   0.007     0.002   0.003   0.003   0.004    
   Average y  (0.45)  (0.37)  (0.34)  (0.69)    (0.68) (0.86) (0.86) (1.35)   
dCapital   0.006   0.007   -0.009   -0.015     0.007   0.007   0.007   0.007    
  (1.50)   (1.70)   (0.25)   (0.36)     (2.10)*   (2.34)*   (2.34)*   (2.32)*    
dLife   -0.144   -0.06   0.595   0.007   -0.425   -0.02   0.048   0.048   -0.128   -0.144  
   Expectancy  (0.89)   (0.38)   (1.11)   (0.02)   (1.37)   (0.14)   (0.33)   (0.33)   (1.50)   (1.78)  
Dummy     -0.003   -0.004   0.001   0.007     -0.003   -0.003   0.001   0.003  
   1980-1985    (1.05)   (1.16)   (0.09)   (1.68)     (1.11)   (1.11)   (0.27)   (1.28)  
Dummy     0.004   0.004   0.007   0.015     0.004   0.004   0.008   0.01  
   1985-1990    (1.72)   (1.15)   (1.21)   (3.73)**     (1.91)   (1.91)   (1.98)*   (4.29)**  
Dummy         0.004   0.012         0.004   0.006  
   1990-1995        (0.83)   (3.07)**         (1.07)   (3.42)**  
Dummy NA         -0.011           -0.004    
   Capital         (1.30)           (1.02)    
Constant   -0.942   -0.953   -1.053   -0.949   -0.871   -1.031   -1.011   -1.011   -1.014   -1.017  
  (7.41)**   (7.29)**   (6.58)**   (6.81)**   (6.83)**   (11.50)**  (10.14)**  (10.14)**   (11.12)**   (11.70)** 
Observations   313   313   313   391   391   313   313   313   391   391  
R-squared   0.7   0.7   0.61   0.62   0.66   0.76   0.77   0.77   0.77   0.76  
a All regressions use FDI stock data in all industries. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *,** significant at 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. —  
b Instruments: tropical, distance to US and area, legal origin, tropical, distance to US, area, latitude, landlocked, exports and imports in 1958, life 
expectancy in 1962. 
Source: Own calculations based on BEA. 
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Table 6 —   Comparison of Coefficients across Regression Sets 
 
Industries, FDI dimensions  
Non-
interacted  Interacted 
Non-
interacted  Interacted 
 and  regression  effect    coefficient  coefficient  t-statistic  t-statistic 
Petroleum   0.008  0.006  -0.232  0.11 
 (2.78)**  (2.05)*  (1.47)  (0.73) 
Total manufacturing   -0.004 0.001  -0.12 -0.149 
  (2.00)*  (0.51) (1.02) (1.33) 
Food and kindred products  -0.025  -0.001  -1.261  -0.186 
 (10.26)**  (0.34)  (9.51)**  (1.48) 
Chemicals and allied products   -0.009  0.001  -0.415  -0.118 
 (4.18)**  (0.61)  (3.52)**  (1.05) 
Primary and fabricated metals   -0.011  0.015  -0.754  0.122 
  (3.32)** (4.72)** (4.09)** (0.70) 
Electronic and other electric equipment   -0.009  0.013  -0.233  0.336 
 (3.18)**  (4.83)**  (1.47)  (2.23)* 
Other manufacturing  -0.01  -0.001 -1.144 -0.648 
 (3.02)**  (0.23)  (6.20)**  (3.69)** 
Wholesale trade   0.008  0.012  -0.047  0.083 
 (3.32)**  (5.15)**  (0.36)  (0.66) 
Finance   -0.009  0.02  -0.919  0.097 
  (2.79)** (6.35)** (4.98)** (0.55) 
Services   0.005  0.019  0.16  0.564 
 (2.22)*  (8.32)**  (1.20)  (4.46)** 











































 (2.95)**  (4.13)**  (2.58)*  (1.86) 
Capital outflows   0.005  0.006  -0.434  -0.282 
  (1.10) (1.45) (1.76) (1.20) 
Income   0.006  0.004  0.074  -0.197 
 (3.22)**  (2.39)*  (0.70)  (1.97) 
Royalties and license fees   0.004  0.007  0.659  0.637 
  (1.58)  (2.78)** (4.31)** (4.38)** 
Total sales by affiliates   0.012  0.004  -0.268  -0.305 
 (5.77)**  (1.80)  (2.29)*  (2.74)** 
Sales by aff. to the United States  0.019  0.026  0.015  0.031 
 (4.12)**  (6.10)**  (0.06)  (0.13) 
Sales by aff. to foreign countries    0.024 0.023 0.413 0.769 
    (except host country)  (5.32)**  (5.38)**  (1.68)  (3.29)** 
Employment of affiliates    0.02  0.004 -0.397 -0.538 
 (10.72)**  (2.44)*  (3.94)**  (5.62)** 
Employee compensation of affiliates    0.024  0.009 -0.213 -0.45 
 (13.20)**  (4.98)**  (2.11)*  (4.70)** 
US imports shipped by aff. to US  parents  -0.005  0.003 -1.363 -0.763 
 (1.10)  (0.69)  (5.55)**  (3.26)** 



























































 (7.18)**  (6.06)**  (0.02)  (0.36) 
1980-1995 sample, all variables   -0.001  0  -0.254  -0.06 
instrumented (0.46)  (0.22)  (2.68)**  (0.66) 
1980-1995 sample, capital changes not   0.002  -0.002  0.174  -0.069 
instrumented, no time dummies  (1.16) (1.12) (1.84) (0.77) 
1980-2000 sample, capital changes not    0.007  0.002 -0.198 -0.129 
instrumented (4.26)**  (1.42)  (2.09)*  (1.43) 






















































































text)  (2.95)** (3.28)** (4.71)** (4.62)** 
Constant    0.025 0.013 2.804 1.855 
  (10.78)**  (6.38)** (22.61)** (15.71)** 
Observations    270 270 270 270 
 
R-squared    0.72 0.52 0.63 0.48 
a Industrial machinery and transportation equipment not significantly different from the reference.— 
bR&D by affiliates 
not significantly different from the reference. 
Source: own calculations based on BEA. 
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Table 7 —  Selected FDI Dimensions: Coefficient and Significance of Non-Interacted and 
Interacted Terms
a 











  FDI stocks on historical cost basis  0.023**  0.021*  0.024*  0.013 
(3.11)  (2.41)  (2.25)  (1.30) 
  FDI outflows  0.049**  0.052*  0.026*  0.019 
(2.81)  (2.13)  (2.28)  (1.19) 
  Employment of affiliates  0.042*  0.017  0.037*  0.014 
(2.28)  (1.12)  (2.18)  (1.01) 
  Total sales by affiliates  0.042**  0.026*  0.025  0.008 
(2.77)  (2.24)  (1.89)  (0.70) 
  Sales by aff. to foreign countries  0.048**  0.037**  0.031*  0.039 
   (except host country)  (3.16)  (2.84)  (2.33)  (1.65) 
  Sales by aff. to United States  0.040**  0.037  0.021  0.042 
(2.82)  (1.91)  (1.40)  (1.33) 
  US exports shipped to aff. by US parents 0.043*  0.015  0.046**  0.047* 
(2.46)  (1.13)  (2.90)  (2.44) 
  US imports shipped by aff. to US parents 0.018  0.015  0.030*  0.044 
(1.23)  (0.93)  (2.01)  (1.50) 
  Royalties and license fees  0.036**  0.03**  0.029**  0.024* 
(3.78)  (2.87)  (3.68)  (2.19) 
  R&D by affiliates  0.099**  0.102**  0.059*  0.082** 
(3.41)  (3.21)  (2.58)  (3.48) 
 
at-statistics in parentheses; *, ** significant at 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively; in italics for 
estimates based on less than 50 observations for the particular FDI dimension. 
Source: own calculations based on BEA. 
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Table 8 —  Selected Industries: Coefficient and Significance of Non-Interacted and 
Interacted Terms
a 
  FDI dimensions: 
  FDI stocks on historical 
cost basis 
Sales by aff. to foreign 
countries (except host 
country) 

















  Petroleum  0.038** 0.034** –  –  –  – 
  (4.18)  (3.12)  –  –  –  – 
  Food and kindred products  0.021*  0.026*  0.031  0.069  0.049  0.099 
  (2.43)  (2.16)  (1.31)  (1.98)  (1.91)  (1.64) 
  Chemicals and   0.015  0.012  0.025*  0.034*  0.024**  0.022**
     allied products  (1.88)  (1.11)  (2.43)  (2.49)  (2.97)  (2.65) 
  Primary and fabricated   0.017*  0.028  0.141** 0.374** 0.042*  0.105 
     metals  (1.99)  (1.64)  (3.89)  (4.86)  (2.19)  (1.78) 
  Industrial machinery   0.022** 0.016  0.086** 0.171** 0.059  0.063 
     and equipment  (2.71)  (1.19)  (3.35)  (3.18)  (1.51)  (1.83) 
  Electronic and other  0.021** 0.028*  0.050** 0.118** 0.035**  0.069**
     electric equipment  (2.79)  (2.27)  (2.67)  (2.82)  (2.85)  (2.67) 
  Transportation equipment  0.026*  0.048** 0.082** 0.275** 0.047*  0.092 
  (2.60)  (2.79)  (2.69)  (3.28)  (2.62)  (1.84) 
  Other manufacturing  0.016  0.011  –  –  0.055*  0.079 
  (1.68)  (0.80)  –  –  (2.47)  (1.57) 
  Wholesale trade  0.038** 0.024*  0.079** 0.141*  0.027**  0.020 
  (3.24)  (2.47)  (2.84)  (2.40)  (2.85)  (1.13) 
  Finance   0.014  0.024  –  –  –  – 
  (1.42)  (1.57)  –  –  –  – 
  Services  0.032** 0.037*  0.033  0.011  0.133**  0.437**
  (3.17)  (2.51)  (1.32)  (0.32)  (3.11)  (5.73) 
  Other industries  0.036** 0.024*  –  –  0.091**  0.183* 
  (3.23)  (2.38)  –  –  (3.02)  (2.55) 
at-statistics in parentheses; *, ** significant at 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively; in italics for 
estimates based on less than 50 observations for the particular FDI dimension and industry. 
Source: own calculations based on BEA. 
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Figure 1 — Relative Importance of Selected Dimensions of FDI
a: Developed and Developing 


























aAll dimensions refer to data for US majority owned non-bank affiliates in all industries. 
Calculated as the share of the respective country group with regard to the specific FDI 
dimension, relative to its share in US FDI stocks (historical cost basis); i.e., figures above 
(below) 1 indicate that the specific FDI dimension figures more (less) prominently than FDI 
stocks for the respective country group.— 
b Developed countries comprise Canada, Europe, 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand.— 
c Based on the sum of exports to, and imports from US 
parent companies.— 
dMeasured by royalties and license fees paid by foreign affiliates to US 
parent companies. 
Source: BEA.  
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Figure 2 — Share of Developing Countries
































aProxied by all countries except Canada, European countries, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand; New Zealand included in food, other manufacturing, services, and other industries 
(due to undisclosed data). 
Source: BEA.  
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Figure 3 - Histograms for US FDI Coefficients and their t-Statistics 
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aIndividual graph lengths adapted to reflect average sample range for each FDI dimension. 
Source: own calculations based on BEA. 35 
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aIndividual graph lengths adapted to reflect average sample range for each industry. 
Source: own calculations based on BEA. 36 
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